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Wittgenstein's Seeing-as Approach to Literary Propositions The novel *Sisters* by Daisy Johnson as a Case Study

Ali Oublal

Faculty of Letters and Humanities,
Ibn Zohr University, Agadir,
Morocco.

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Abstract:

Wittgenstein's aspect appertains to human experience; it fundamentally reveals a lot about human perception, and language-employment. On this basis we explore seeing -as in literature notably the novel *Sisters*. Clearly this proposition has connections with the fact that if literary works are read from logico-philosophic theories, they are thus deprived of its value(s). For Wolfgang, Russell deprives literature of its aesthetic-cognitive value while considering propositions in Hamlet untrue as there is no referent of Hamlet in the world. However, Wittgenstein's aspect allows refuting such a judgment; instead literature can be read using these theories without dooming it to inferiority or meaninglessness.

Keywords: seeing -as- perception, literary propositions.

Introduction

Perhaps "deaths in Venice: The Cases of Gustav von Aschenbach" by Philip Kitcher can be taken as the suitable starting point that questions our scientific curiosity to bring this article to the fore. If it- I mean our choice - has to be argued, it is within the scope of the philosophical reading the author provided to Thomas Mann's novel. True, his profound analysis is unquestionably auspicious, however what the analysis underlines in depth, which is our concern, is the interact bonds between literature and philosophy. On such basis I hence suggest one of the key founders of analytic philosophy Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of language to the core of this article. An array of aims can come out of this proposition, the most above all is to unearth the literary dimension of Wittgenstein on the one hand, on the other to skip over and take a step further claiming that arts by and large can be read from even the philosophical perspectives which are deeply influenced by logic. Wittgenstein remains very much influential in this regard. I consequently intend to establish debate anew over

literature- the novel of daisy Johnson 'sisters' - and philosophy by virtue of aspect perception of Wittgenstein. Part of what follows is thus a brief overview about aspect perception.

The so-called "aspects" has preoccupied Wittgenstein since the last two decades. Literarily localising it, typescripts and his later manuscripts are devoted to this area as a field of investigation. The following ideas with which we intend to develop this introduction are scattered throughout the above mentioned references. In his later philosophy section xi of part II of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein addresses rather orients initially his readers towards that aspect perception. Four major points if not cues are to be considered based of course upon the remarks included in *Philosophical investigations*. The first and foremost is that Wittgenstein contrasts aspect with the firstly "object of sight" of dissimilar category (PI §195a, §195b, §206b). He additionally brings that contrast with the property of object (§212a). If somebody sees something based on certain conditions under which that sight occurs, this does not necessarily mean that another would see it without of course undermining the competence of the former. With these two aspects of contrast, we can understand that Wittgenstein aims to merely say that seeing-as fails to teach us anything about the external world (RPP I 899).

The second idea is the necessity of description or otherwise representation of the objects of sight one fails to see. I hope not to be read against the grain; Wittgenstein simply means that the person is required to make accurate representation of the object since while failing to see the aspect. Another feature with which Wittgenstein ascribes and subjects his aspect is the will (RPP I 899, 976; RPP II 545).because it makes sense to call upon the other to see those objects, and additionally see such a particular aspect (see PI §213e).

The third idea is closely undetected from the former as , along with insisting on the none-detachability between aspect and the object , it also provide some illumination about the two key words 'description' and 'representation'. In this sense, Wittgenstein considers the concept of representation 'elastic, and so together with it is the concept of what is seen' (§198c). . To the end of clarity of it, he suggests taking into account "the occasion and purpose" of different forms of "description" (§221e).and he adds "It is necessary to get down to the application" (§201a). The last but not the least feature Wittgenstein attributes to his seeing-as is the experience of noticing. To wordily state it, "Everything has changed, and yet nothing has changed". With the same regard, he suggests for the aspect to be aspect it has to strike us otherwise "only dawns" and "does not remain" (RPP I 1021); "[it] lasts only as long as I am occupied with the object in a particular way" (PI §210c).

Part of what I hope to show in the reminder of this introduction, after having briefly characterized Wittgenstein's seeing –as, is why we intend to apply such a conception on literary proposition; as already claimed, a reader of Wittgenstein cannot pass over in silence the logical roots of his entire philosophy, yet omnipresent in *Tractatus*. As being logically rooted, his philosophy of language, as might some think, can derive literature from its cognitive and aesthetic value, and thus Wittgenstein's philosophy will be distanced from arts by and large. The otherwise view we hold is that Wittgenstein cannot be confined to philosophy; his propositions- though they are addressed to how philosophers fails to understand the logic and significance of language - which consist the body of his conception of language are as well useful to read any piece of literature without degrading neither philosophy nor literature. To this end we propose to analytically read one of the statements extracted from the novel of Daisy Johnson *Sisters*.

The Analysis

1-Aspect perception: Seeing –as.

“I look like Mum. Or like her mum she says, our grandmother, in India, where we have never been. September does not look like us.” (Daisy Johnson, 2021)

For the present discussion, the most important word that we perhaps see as the paradigm which microscopically can narrow our scope to one very prominent corner in Wittgenstein's philosophy is the verb “look”. The latter captivates our attention, as it might do so for everyone who reads Wittgenstein's propositions notably his philosophical investigations. On such a basis- the use of the verb ‘look’ thus, we come up with some points of convergence between the novelist's words and Wittgenstein's propositions, yet not decided if those meeting points are conceptual or else. The verb “look” involves us into Wittgenstein's behavioural criteria of mental phenomena along with the aspects of perception. According to Wittgenstein, there must not be any presupposition that mental concepts are restricted but only “look” and “see” (PI 66). The two verbs are sometimes used synonymously and interchangeably, while in certain contexts they are differently in use. Our analysis is set upon the former stance.

With first glimpse at the literary proposition, the novelist attributes his words to a little girl July aiming to unearth the doubt July lives, and the ordeal she suffers in her biological identity. Having so is expressed by the use of “look like” that is an equivalent to “seeing as”. On such a basis then we are positioned to analyse the above literary proposition. An

enthraling ordeal, a persistently ghoulish account of grief and guilt, identity and co-dependency the novelist brings to the readers in her narratives keeps circling back to the past in Wittgenstein's philosophy, notably between 1946 and 1949. During that time Wittgenstein was concerned with aspect perception or seeing-as. (typescripts, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*,) also in his remarks about the *Philosophy of Psychology* Wittgenstein contributes to such a debate. His extensions on the topic are included in remarks provided in (MS 144; TS 234) which are later published as 'Part II' of *Philosophical Investigations*.¹ So to analyse our proposition based on aspect perception we are required to first of all understand what is meant by aspect of perception. In his 1949 selection Wittgenstein states:

“Two uses of the word ‘see’. The one: ‘What do you see there?’—‘I see this’ (and then a description, a drawing, a copy). The other: ‘I see a likeness in these two faces’—let the man to whom I tell this be seeing the faces as clearly as I do myself. What is important is the categorial difference between the two ‘objects’ of sight’. I observe a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience ‘noticing an aspect’. (PPF §§111, 113; p. 193).

Not only so, Wittgenstein adds other examples to clearly make his aspect plain. For example,

B)-Seeing a geometrical drawing as a glass cube or as an inverted open box, or as three boards forming a solid angle (PPF §116; p. 193); or again, seeing a triangle as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow or pointer, as an overturned object which is meant, for example, to stand on the shorter sight of the right angle, as a half parallelogram, etc. (PPF §162; p.200).

(C) Seeing an ambiguous puzzle picture in one way, e.g. seeing a rabbit's head in what at first glance looks just like the drawing of a duck's head (PPF §118; p. 194); or a human figure where there were previously branches (PPF §131; p. 196).

(D) Suddenly recognizing a familiar object in an unusual position or lighting (PPF §141; p. 197); or recognizing an old acquaintance (PPF §§143–4; p. 197).

(E) Seeing three-dimensionally (PPF §148; p. 198).

(F) Seeing a sphere in a picture as floating in the air (PPF §169; p. 201); or seeing a horse in a picture as galloping (PPF §175; p. 202).

(G) Aspects of organization: seeing a row of four equidistant dots either as two groups of two dots or as two dots in the middle bracketed by a dot on each side (cf. PPF §§220–1; p. 208)

If necessarily we are required to nest all those propositions into one brief idea, we are hence unable to escape Stephen Munhall's own interpretation. They are constituents of the idea that aspect perception is a ubiquitous phenomenon: "everything we perceive, we perceive in its relevant aspects: in a picture we immediately see what it represents and respond to it accordingly just as we always see artefacts as what they are for us, what roles they play in our lives, or again, we generally experience words as having a certain meaning"; people always take up the attitude towards objects that Heidegger calls readiness-to-hand.

In regard to the aspect of perception from Wittgenstein's view, we can simply say that the state of looking like a mother is what does the picture represent for July but we can say it is not necessarily true. Back to the novel, the centrality of it lies in the elusiveness individuals live in their identity, sisters included; this actually is seen through the fluidity of identity of all characters in the novel. Here the distinction can be made between knowing and seeing. To understand so, we consider the difference Wittgenstein makes between knowledge of an aspect—say, what a picture represents—and actually seeing it as the following argues:

"When should I call it just knowing, not seeing?—Perhaps when someone treats the picture as a working drawing, reads it like a blueprint". (PPF §192; p. 204)

What is thus known and seen in the literary proposition? If knowing necessitates a picture, and in our case mother's look "is a picture, the thought of July is thus knowing not seeing because what she conceives is given, rather represented by the object "mother's look". This is not hence her attitude towards her mother, or else amongst her family members or even an outsider. The reason is that July does not just read off some characteristics about the visual appearance of her mother, rather she sees her in the picture, Wittgenstein argues:

"we view the photograph, the picture on our wall, as the very object (the man, landscape and so on) represented in it. (PPF §197; p. 205).

It is accordingly plain, not any picture is accurate nor what does represent is true, some doubt can be there, and this is Wittgenstein's point. J. Hyman (1992) claims in that regard "looking at that portrait we see a man with a moustache (the picture's 'internal subject'), and don't just apprehend pieces of information about the appearance of a man, e.g. that he has a moustache". If applied on the literary proposition, mother's look is doubtful as

well. Not sure whether it is a resemblance to July or not. July only sees in the portrait of her mother, the doubt continued and supported as well by novelist's words implementing " or " as if July looks like her mum or her grandmother. In both cases, the identity mainly biological is perturbing, sisters live a state of instability in that sense; this is a form of illustration of the fact that the novelist succeeds in treating the issue of identity for it is well-stylistically – linguistically – formed according to Wittgenstein's theory of perception. We state so as Wittgenstein himself applies the 'seeing-as' – look like - locution to ordinary and 'unambiguous pictures, and not only to puzzle pictures that can be seen first as one thing and then as another' the case of literary proposition is considered in the light of the latter – puzzling pictures- as the former is regarded as the 'continuous seeing' of an aspect (PPF §118; p. 194). Both Mulhall consider continuous seeing as the main concern of Wittgenstein as P. F. Strawson himself holds :

'the striking case of the change of aspects merely dramatizes for us a feature (namely seeing as) which is present in perception in general.'

This indeed true and corresponds to the Wittgenstein's discussion on aspect perception in his 1949 selection of remarks (PPF) with the case of seeing a likeness, for all the examples given can be regarded as variations of this theme. That aspect perception entails observing similarity as wordily comes through Wittgenstein's proposition 'In all those cases one can say that one experiences a comparison' (RPP I §317). Based upon the following proposition RPP I §508, 'an object is seen as a variation, or derivation, or copy, of another one. When I see something as X I am aware of a similarity between it and X, be it a glass cube, the head of a rabbit, or a galloping horse.⁷ But then, it can be argued that virtually all seeing is or involves seeing resemblances. When I see a tree, for example, and realize that it is a tree, I see its resemblance with other trees. In general, seeing that something is of a certain kind involves seeing its likeness, in relevant respects, with other, familiar, objects of that kind. And even when looking at an arrangement of shapes and colours I cannot make out what it is or represents, I will at least be able to identify certain shapes and colours, which again means: seeing in what way they are like other shapes and colours I've seen before. To the extent to which 'to see' is a verb of epistemic success, every seeing involves identification of kinds of objects or appearances, which means seeing them as similar to others of that kind'

The view that " now I see it as ..." is clearly stated by Wittgenstein as being inappropriate in cases of ordinary perception. Let's consider the example given by him, once

one fails to realize the ambiguity of the duck-rabbit drawing, one sees it as the drawing of a duck's head..” seeing as “ then makes some sense as to say at the sight of knife and fork “ now o see this as a knife and fork “. The same is valid for July who is in that insatiable state in terms of her identity, biologically speaking. However there might any point of resemblance between her and mum. The novelist intends thus to tell that her characters are in the state of seeking their identity, as long as they fail to realize their identity they can thus see others as their resemblance. If we consider the proposition of Wittgenstein He sees the picture as a duck’ (PPF §§120–2; pp. 194 f), we can legitimately state that July see her mother as her resemblance . In that vein, it is possible to ask when exactly, contrastively, one can consider anomalous attitudes towards a picture as long as there is question of seeing something as something else – seeing mother as her in our case, and consequently the proposition is out of place. Wittgenstein answers lies in his imagining people who can be resisted by small black and white photographs, and can perhaps be unable to see human faces in them (PPF §198; p. 205). Conversely by virtue of these people saying that we “view a portrait as a human being’ (PPF §199; p. 205) in a meaningful way. With this conception, we can simply state that the novelist utterances, rather words attributed to July cannot be meaningful if they are not read within the context of the work, with its characters, settings and the so; that is, one has to imagine himself as being a character in that story, as the novelist himself imagines his readers as being part of the story. Beyond such, none, not only the July’ propositions, can have meaning.

The question which arises here is that “ are the two types of “ seeing as “, one dispositional, one episodic different? As stated in the following proposition:

“I say: ‘We view a portrait as a human being’—when do we do so, and for how long? Always, if we see it at all (and don’t, say, see it as something else)? I might go along with this, and thereby determine the concept of viewing a picture.—The question is whether yet another concept, related to this one, also becomes important to us: that, namely, of a seeing-as which occurs only while I am actually concerning myself with the picture as the object represented. (PPF §199; p. 205)

We might find sufficient answer in such a proposition:” The phenomenon we are talking about is the lighting up of an aspect. (LW I §429). It is very plain that the concept of short-lived experience is unlike general attitude, and the former that is of a prominence in Wittgenstein’s thought. The episodic sense of aspect perception is unstable state (RPP II

§540). Only in the alteration of aspect does one become conscious of an aspect (LW I §169). But the question here is that can we say that the state of July is unstable, which can be changed over time? If we read it from the stance of biological identity, we can say July perhaps does not resemble her mother in her teen years, as may be her mother herself looked like July while she was in her age . For biological features of beings change over time, there is a possibility to look the same in certain age , and that is lived in our everyday life; this simply argues for instable state human beings live in their biological identity . On the other hand , we can interpret the literary proposition in the light of the aspect perception ‘ seeing as ‘ – look like – in our context . With this view, we can say that July is in an age is not enough for July to realize if she looks like her mother or not, it only seems to her that she resembles her mother or maybe not , by the time – when changes occur – she can later become conscious of that aspect ; in such a case , the state is as well instable . The two readings meet in the fact that sudden experience of change that make the aspect perception , and this is the core of Wittgenstein philosophy in aspect perception (LW I §173). Wittgenstein takes The experience of aspect perception as experience of recognition, which also does not last all the time as states in his lectures:

“Do I always see a thing as something, although only puzzle-pictures bring this out?... Suppose I show it to a child. The child says, ‘It’s a duck’ and then suddenly, ‘Oh it’s a rabbit.’ So he recognizes it as a rabbit. This is an experience of recognition. So if you see me in the street and say, ‘Ah, Wittgenstein.’ But you haven’t an experience of recognition all the time. The experience only comes at the moment of change from duck to rabbit and back. In between, the aspect is as it were dispositional. ... Geach: Couldn’t I say at any time how I see it—not just when it changes? Wittgenstein: Only if you are concentrating on it ... (LPP 103–4).

Before coming to the psychological dimension in our analysis – of course based on Wittgenstein- let’s briefly put Wittgenstein’s account over that aspect perception. We humbly claim that such an account significance lies in how it shifts our heed towards psychoanalysis to the literary proposition. Very clearly noted, Wittgenstein’s aspect perception is two-fold ; dispositional and episodic (appertaining to a particular experience); he later denies the ubiquity of aspect perception (RPP I §§24, 860; LW I §§170, 454). This on the one hand , on the other hand , Wittgenstein insists on mastering the psychological dimension of the concept – relating it with the groups with which is put – so that seeing something as

something can happen. Accordingly a logical condition of one's having an experience of aspect perception is that one has mastered a certain technique (PPF §§222–4; pp. 208–9):

“ But how odd for this to be the logical condition of someone's having such-and-such an experience! After all, you don't say that one only 'has toothache' if one is capable of doing such-and-such. (PPF §223; p. 208)

The concern of Wittgenstein is thus the concept of a momentary experience of seeing-as; because the mastery of a technique should manifest itself, dispositionally, in—and be presumed by—a certain attitude towards a picture is not in the same way puzzling. This account suggests the shift of Wittgenstein makes between two different types of aspect perception. Wittgenstein occupation with two connected accounts does not separate them however they are distinct. For him the two problems are :

(1) Are visual aspects (resemblances) actually seen or are they only thought of in an interpretation? (2) How (or in what sense) is it possible to experience an aspect (a thought, the meaning of a picture) in an instant?

Understanding those two problems requires having typescript as reference upon which Wittgenstein develops his philosophy of psychology.

2-Aspect of perception: is it seeing or interpreting?

In the light of seeing and interpreting, we consider the second part of a proposition that goes : “We do not remember our father but she must look like him, smooth-haired, cheeks soft with blonde fuzz, pale-eyed like a snow animal.”

July sometimes talks of her state – biological identity - while in others she shifts our attention to that state of her sister September. The latter ‘ identity that counts for the novelist herself, For the novelist aims to clearly picture the state of July after the death of September, by only this way, Daisy Johnson shows the degree of attachment July feels towards September. That is why July starts with the pronoun “ we “ including herself and then shifts to the pronoun “ she “ (September) This is in brief the context of the second part of our extracted literary proposition. However, our concern here is “ look like him, smooth-haired, cheeks soft with blonde fuzz, pale-eyed like a snow animal.” July has still some doubt whether they – sisters – resemble their father or not? That once again support the idea of seeing-as, which we concluded that it is their state of instability – short-lived seeing as. What

interests us here is how the novelist attributes some features of animal to their father or even the reverse. And here we can ask if beings can have those features of animals as the case of their father who is literary represented as a snow animal? To answer this question, we propose to be back the two problems mentioned above. Let's start then by "(1) Are visual aspects actually seen or are they only thought of in an interpretation? (PPF §§140, 144, 148, 149, 169, 175, 181 f., 187, 190, 248.). If we go back to the opening remark in (PPF §111) we can say that people by and large say they see aspects , but could not be only a conventional figure of speech , a derivative (metonymical) use of the word 'see' (PPF §169; p. 201; cf. §190; p. 204)? Let's argue with (LW I §765) by emphasising sometimes we use combine some words that cannot be literarily joined, marry money that simply means marrying a rich person. We are thus unable to skip the , Wittgenstein's analogy with the phenomenon of 'secondary meaning': "Under certain circumstances we are prepared to apply colour words to vowels (PPF §177; p. 202); or the words 'fat' and 'meagre' to days of the week (PPF §§274–8; p. 216). But we are always prepared to add that this is just a quirk of language: of course the letter 'e' is not really yellow; and Wednesday is not really fat. Similarly, it might be held that an aspect is not really seen, but only thought of or associated with one's vision"

Berkeley 's contribution in this regard is prominent ; he contends "that the ideas of space, outness, and things placed at a distance, are not, strictly speaking, the object of sight". "All we actually see are configurations of colour; anything else can only be 'suggested to the mind by the mediation of some other idea which is itself perceived in the act of seeing'"

May be Wittgenstein has an odd argument against Berkeley who considers aspects as only interpretations; he puts then :

- (i) 'To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state' (PPF §248; p. 212). That is, seeing has genuine duration: one can ask for how long one saw the drawing as a duck before it changed to a rabbit, whereas it sounds incongruous to ask for the duration of an interpretation (LPP 330).¹⁴

To analytically prove that difference between seeing and interpreting, we rather intend to read the literary proposition in the light of the first point. If we consider what July says about her father as her thought -only thinks ; that is interprets , we cannot be right by whatsoever means because the biological features cannot bear any further interpretations or readings. So July does not think – interpret –according to Wittgenstein- because she does not take a step further to do something, she only sees her father as a snow animal; it is only an

intervalllic picture according to her age, may be it might be changed later on; and here we come back to the fact that only change that makes consciousness of the person about aspects. Even if the changes occur in her father features, she would not think of the else, rather she would see him in another picture.

The second point for which Wittgenstein argues comes as follows:

- (ii) ‘When we interpret we form hypotheses, which may prove false’, whereas ‘‘I see this figure as a...’’ can be verified as little as (or only in the same sense as) ‘‘I see a bright red’’ ’ (PPF §249; p. 212).—This, however, is problematic. For one thing, seeing too tends to involve taking something to be true, which may conceivably turn out to be false (e.g. if it is an illusion or hallucination). And my seeing-as can also turn out to be true or false: for instance, when in the dark I see as a suspicious human figure what in truth is only a bush. Or, to take one of Wittgenstein’s examples, I suddenly seem to recognize an old friend, seeing his former face in an older one (PPF §143; p. 197)—but then it turns out that it wasn’t him after all. Of course, seeing something as X need not involve any belief that it actually is X, but then, similarly, one can retreat from hypothesizing to mere imagining. That is, both on the side of vision and on the side of thinking one can distinguish between taking something to be true and merely toying with an idea. Thus, the fact that many cases of seeing-as belong to the latter category may show that they cannot be construed as interpreting, yet, more importantly; it is not enough to set them apart from thinking and vindicate them as proper seeing.

In the light of such a point, we can say that July does not interpret her father’s facials, she does not think of him as a snow animal, she sees him as a snow animal; that true proposition if it has to be verified, requires its picture in the world which actually exists .On the other hand, her seeing –as does not require any belief that her father looks like a snow animal, but here the little girl is involved in the state of imagining. She only imagines her father as a snow animal, and that is the case , because as sisters they have never seen him. What if we consider the literary proposition according to the point below:

- (iii) If seeing something as X were only an interpretation (assertorical or fictional), superimposed on what is actually seen, it should be possible to describe what is actually seen, the none-interpreted data; but typically we cannot. Saying ‘I see it as ...’ is not just an indirect description of the visual experience that could be replaced

by a more direct one. It is the most appropriate report of what I see (PPF §117; pp. 193f.; RPP I §318). Or, in some cases, it would perhaps be possible to replace the expression of an aspect perception (e.g. the three-dimensional impression of a landscape, or a facial expression) by a Berkeleian description in terms of mere colours and shapes, but only after special instruction and practice (PPF §148; p. 198; LPP 110).

Another sound justification that clearly enlightens our understanding is what July sees as cannot be described but rather not replaced by what is actually seen. July thus does not interpret because if she interprets, some descriptions should be provided but she lives that experience, which illustrates that the act of interpreting is out of our context. What is seen is a true experience in a nutshell. And that true proposition is a picture, and thus a proposition is a picture of reality. And that is the reality July lives. This is what is illuminated in the following point:

- (iv) (iv) As already explained above: when we see a picture as representing something, we do not read it like a blueprint, but respond to it as to the object represented (PPF §§192–9; pp. 204 f.). The aspect is directly perceived and not only thought or known to be there as the result of an interpretation. This experience of actual perception is also manifest in certain emphatic expressions, such as: ‘The sphere [in the picture] seems to float’, ‘One sees it floating’, ‘It floats!’ (PPF §169; p. 201), or, of an eye represented by a dot: ‘See how it’s looking!’ (PPF §201; p. 205).

Following our analysis and argumentation meantime, July doubts if September resembles her father and thus if her father looks like a snow animal. For though she sees her father as a snow animal, she is unsure that September looks like her father and thus the latter resemblance is doubtful as well. And that is the case for teenagers; their state of instability proves so. Furthermore, the instability of identity July lives mainly after her sister’s death is another proof. They might see something as something, as they might think of something as being something but it is not true; however July sees a resemblance between her father and snow animal, there is a possibility to not exist, and this is proven by the following point:

- (v) Finally, as already noted, seeing-as is essentially noticing a resemblance, an internal relation between an object and other objects, real or imagined (PPF §247; p. 212). But the

act of noticing a visual resemblance cannot be construed as distinct from that of seeing (the resemblance). Of course you can see the same object without noticing the resemblance, but the noticing (when it occurs while looking) is not a mental operation distinct from seeing. Rather, it is seeing (LW I §511).

The four above mentioned remarks are the conceptual justifications that leads Wittgenstein calls visual perception ‘ seeing’ . However the last point - (v)—namely that in aspect perception one experiences a comparison (RPP I §317)—works also to dissolve two ostensible objections to calling it ‘seeing’, which emphasises the way aspect perception can alter. The first conception which is objected is the changed status of the object . What is changed is only interpretation. This elucidates the fact that the subjective dimension of experience, that change is not truthful cognition of object despite it is stated as if it is a visual perception (PPF §137; p. 197). This first objection justifies the idea that how July sees her father that changes over time but not the facials of her father. The second idea which Wittgenstein objects is accepting seeing – as as a proper case of seeing is it subject to the will (PPF §256; p. 213; cf. RPP II §544).

To briefly put , visual aspect perception is called ‘ seeing ‘ for Wittgenstein simply because it includes certain attitudes towards an object notably the internal object of a pictorial representation (PPF §193; p. 205).And this is indeed the case for July and her sister who only build their attitudes towards their father . If we go back to the novel , we would find that both sisters have never seen their father nor their grandmother , but they still hold some attitudes towards them . That is why the novelist attribute “ I look like my mother” . Seeing -as instead – along with its episodic sense – is continuous and dispositional. If this justifies something, it is in short the idea that how sisters see their father and grandmother is still continued.

Conclusion

The objective conclusions that come up in the above analytical account are so many. The prominence however goes first of all to the significance of his aspect in aesthetic experience, judgment and understanding as well. Having said that assist our claim to reveal that linguistic understanding is organically associated with understanding of art. Wittgenstein’s aspect is important in reading any literary work in the sense that non-literally reading takes place; a reader of a literary work requires going beyond what is written by considering the attitudes of the person who claims to see something that the other cannot see

in the object providing the context of the proposition. The claim that the status of the object does not change yet only interpretations which do implies the fact idea readings that one can provide to a literary proposition differs from one person to another. Objects – referents of names – that are constituents of a proposition cannot be restricted to one single interpretation, however the context remains the same and the status of objects is unchanged. The difference that may occur in terms of thinking about something and later on figured out as untrue justifies the fact that interpretations provided to literary propositions are only relative; and this implies the idea that different interpretations differ based on the adopted approach. All these features attributed to the aspect perception of Wittgenstein converge on the fact that Wittgenstein's theory of perception is a applicably fit to read literature.

List of abbreviations:

LC: Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief.

M: Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33', notes by G.E. Moore,

.ML: Wittgenstein: Lectures Cambridge 1930-33: From the Notes of G.E. Moore,

PI: Philosophical Investigations,

RPP: Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology,

LWL: Ludwig Wittgenstein' lectures

NB: Notebooks

PR: Philosophical Remarks

MT: Movements of Thought: Notebooks

PG: Philosophical Grammar

PPF : Philosophy of Psychology

PP I: Remarks on Philsophy of Pyscholgy (vol 1)

Pp II: Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology (vol.2)

LW I : Last writing on the Philosophy of Psychology (vol .1)

LW II : Last writing on the Philosophy of Psychology (vol .2)

LPP : Wittgenstien's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology

NPL : Notes for the Philsophical Lecture

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